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TURNER V. ROGERS AND THE RIGHT OF MEANINGFUL
ACCESS TO THE COURTS
LAURA K. ABELt
The Supreme Court's opinion last term in Turner v. Rogers was a
new take on an old question: what is meaningful access to the courts, and
how do we know when a litigant has it?' In Turner, a man sent to prison
for a year for civil contempt for willful failure to pay court-ordered child
support claimed that his due process rights had been violated because he
lacked legal representation at his contempt hearing.
The Court held that a litigant does not have meaningful access to
the courts if all he can do is file initial papers or walk into the courthouse
door. Rather, the Court held, for a litigant to have meaningful access, he
must be able to identify the central issues in the case and present evi-
dence and arguments regarding those issues. 2 In so holding, the Court
implicitly rejected the definition of meaningful access used by the Court
in its 1996 opinion Lewis v. Casey,3 which encompassed only the ability
to present grievances to the Court, and embraced a broader definition
from its 1977 opinion in Bounds v. Smith4 that litigants must be able to
engage in "an adversary presentation." This portion of the opinion thus
holds promise for a reinvigorated federal constitutional role in ensuring
that people who lack counsel nonetheless are able to participate meaning-
fully in their civil cases.
At the same time, the Court's application of its meaningful access
standard threatens to rob that standard of any real meaning. The Court
adopted a suggestion by a nonparty, presented for the first and only time
in a Supreme Court amicus brief, that civil contempt defendants can ob-
tain meaningful access to the courts if they are provided with minimal
assistance: a notice identifying the ability to pay as the central issue in
the case, a form requesting information about their ability to pay, a hear-
ing at which they are questioned about the information on the form, and a
finding on whether the defendant had the ability to pay.5 The Court's
embrace of this extra-record information resembles the Court's analyses
of the abilities of pro se litigants in two other cases, Lassiter v. Depart-
ment of Social ServiceS6 and Walters v. National Association of Radia-
t Deputy Director, National Center for Access to Justice at Cardozo Law School
1. Turner v. Rogers, 131 S. Ct. 2507 (2011).
2. See discussion infra Part 11.
3. 518 U.S. 343, 346 (1996).
4. 430 U.S. 817, 826 (1977).
5. See discussion infra Part Ill.
6. 452 U.S. 18 (1981).
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tion Survivors,7 which likewise rely on the Justices' intuitions regarding
the abilities of pro se litigants, even in the face of evidence to the contra-
ry.
This Article proceeds as follows. Part I describes the Court's opin-
ion in Turner and how the legal academy has reacted to it so far. Part II
describes the Court's holding regarding the definition of meaningful ac-
cess, compares that definition to the definitions used in Lewis and
Bounds, and posits that what emboldened the Turner Court to broaden
the right of meaningful access were innovations in pro se assistance that
are cheaper than providing counsel. Part III describes how the Turner
Court relied on facts not in evidence to conclude that measures short of
counsel could provide meaningful access to the courts, notes that appel-
late courts generally do not rely on extra-record evidence, and points to
similarities between the Court's treatment of the facts in this case and in
Lassiter and Walters. Finally, the Article concludes that the only way to
make the meaningful access standard meaningful is for the courts to rely
on empirical evidence regarding the capabilities of pro se litigants.
I. THE TURNER OPINION
In Turner, the Court considered the plight of Michael Turner, who
spent a year in prison for civil contempt for failure to pay child support.
He had no lawyer at his civil contempt hearing.9 Mr. Turner argued that
his due process rights were violated when he was incarcerated for over a
year without being represented by counsel.'o Justice Breyer, writing for a
five-justice majority, held that Mr. Turner did not have a categorical
right to counsel under the federal Constitution." The Court applied the
Mathews v. Eldridgel2 test for due process violations, which considers:
(1) the nature of "the private interest that will be affected," (2) the
comparative "risk" of an "erroneous deprivation" of that interest with
and without "additional or substitute procedural safeguards," and (3)
the nature and magnitude of any countervailing interest in not provid-
ing "additional or substitute procedural requirement[s]." 3
The Court acknowledged that the first factor "argues strongly" in
favor of the appointment of counsel because Mr. Turner faced the poten-
tial loss of his liberty. 14 However, the Court held that the second factor
weighed against appointment of counsel because the "critical question,"
which the Court identified as the defendant's "ability to pay," is often
7. 473 U.S. 305 (1985); see discussion infra Part Ill.
8. Turner v. Rogers, 131 S. Ct. 2507, 2513 (2011).
9. Id.
10. Id. at 2515-16.
11. Id. at 2520.
12. 424 U.S. 319 (1976).
13. Id. at 2517-18 (quoting Eldridge,424 U.S. at 335).
14. Id. at 2518.
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"straightforward" when "the right procedures are in place." 5 To identify
those procedures, the Court relied on a suggestion by the Solicitor Gen-
eral, appearing as amicus curiae, that:
Those safeguards include (1) notice to the defendant that his "ability
to pay" is a critical issue in the contempt proceeding; (2) the use of a
form (or the equivalent) to elicit relevant financial information; (3) an
opportunity at the hearing for the defendant to respond to statements
and questions about his financial status, (e.g., those triggered by his
responses on the form); and (4) an express finding by the court that
the defendant has the ability to pay.
The Court also held that the second and third Mathews factors
weighed against appointing counsel because Rebecca Rogers, the mother
of Mr. Turner's child and his opposing party, lacked representation, so
that "[a] requirement that the State provide counsel to the noncustodial
parent in these cases could create an asymmetry of representation that
would 'alter significantly the nature of the proceeding.""' In fact, the
Court concluded, providing Mr. Turner with counsel "could make the
proceedings less fair overall, increasing the risk of a decision that would
erroneously deprive a family of the support it is entitled to receive."18
To some observers, the decision holds the promise of expanded ac-
cess to the courts.19 For instance, if the Court relies on Turner to hold
that there is a right to counsel in civil cases in which there is counsel on
the other side, or in which the government is on the other side, then the
case may ultimately be viewed as expanding the right to counsel in civil
cases. 2 0 Additionally, Turner may come to be seen as requiring trial
courts to provide unrepresented litigants with assistance short of full rep-
resentation, such as forms, information about court processes, and ques-
tions from the bench about essential issues.2 1
15. Id. at 2518-19.
16. Id. at 2519.
17. Id. at 2519 (quoting Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 787 (1973)).
18. Id.
19. See, e.g., Richard Zorza & David Udell, A Final Turner Post From Your Co-Hosts,
CONCURRING OPINIONS (June 28, 2011, 12:20 PM),
http://www.concurringopinions.com/archives/category/symposium-tumer-v-rogers; Jeanne Charn,
Turner v. Rogers, CONCURRING OPINIONS (June 27, 2011, 7:07 PM),
http://www.concurringopinions.com/archives/2011/06/turner-v-rogers-2.html.
20. See Mark Noferi, Turner' Could Support Appointed Counsel for Immigrants, 246 N.Y.
L.J. 15, (2011) ("In short, although the Court sidestepped arguments regarding immigrant detainees,
its reasoning might one day support a groundbreaking right to counsel for immigrants detained
pending deportation proceedings .... ).
21. See Richard Zorza, A New Day for Judges and the Self-Represented: The Implications of
Turner v. Rogers, JUDGES' J., Fall 2011, at 16, 16 ("Before Turner, it was not yet fully settled for all
whether judges can appropriately intervene in such civil cases. After Turner, the issues are when
must they do so, and how they can most effectively do so in the situations in which they are either
required or choose to intervene."); Michael Millemann, Turner-Implications for Civil Gideon, the
Use of Unbundled Legal Services to Provide Access, and the Lawyers' Practice Monopoly,
CONCURRING OPINIONS (June 26, . 2011 8:28 PM),
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The Turner opinion has also been criticized on many grounds. It
represents a dangerous incursion into the principle that people should not
be sent to prison until they have had the benefit of a lawyer making the
strongest possible case for their freedom. 22 It understates the difficulty of
the willfulness determination at the heart of the case, in part by charac-
terizing the central issue as "ability to pay," not willfulness. 23 The
Court's claim that providing Mr. Turner with a lawyer would make the
proceeding less fair is odd, given that the judge is the ultimate decider of
the facts and the law, whether or not there is a lawyer. 24 And, the Court
did not adequately acknowledge that while Mr. Turner's freedom was at
stake his opponent's was not, a situation that could justify providing rep-
resentation to him but not her.2 5 In Part III below, this Article describes
another flaw in the decision: the Court's reliance on facts not in the rec-
ord to determine the level of assistance that unrepresented litigants need
in order to have meaningful access to the courts.
II. TURNER HOLDS THAT LITIGANTS MUST BE ABLE TO IDENTIFY
CRITICAL ISSUES AND PRESENT RELEVANT EVIDENCE FOR ACCESS TO
BE MEANINGFUL
The Turner Court held that while Mr. Turner did not necessarily
have a right to counsel, he did have a right to meaningful access to the
courts, and that the right had been violated in his case. Specifically, the
Court held, Mr. Turner should have been provided with notice that the
key issue in his case was whether he was able to pay child support, a
form eliciting relevant information about his ability to pay, and a hearing
at which he could answer any remaining questions about his ability to
pay.26 Thus, the Court held that in order for Mr. Turner to have meaning-
ful access, he should have been able to identify the critical issues in his
case and present relevant evidence regarding those issues.
http://www.concurringopinions.com/archives/category/symposium-tumer-v-rogers ("[Diepending on
the three Mathews factors, some of the forms of limited assistance that many legal services projects
provide to indigent litigants in family law cases may be constitutionally required in some of those
and other civil cases, thus validating the access to court right.").
22. Joy Moses, With Turner, Access to Justice Efforts Must Expand, CONCURRING OPINIONS
(June 27, 2011 4:39 PM), http://www.concurringopinions.com/archives/category/symposium-tumer-
v-rogers.
23. Norman Reimer, Turner v. Rogers: The Right to Counsel Haunted by the Ghost of Gag-
non, CONCURRING OPINIONs (June 27, 2011, 4:51 PM),
http://www.concurringopinions.com/archives/2011/06/turner-v-rogers-the-right-to-counsel-haunted-
by-the-ghost-of-gagnon.html; John Pollock, Turner v. Rogers: Why the Supreme Court Is a Day Late
and a Dollar Short, CONCURRING OPINIONS (June 22, 2011, 6:05 PM),
http://www.concurringopinions.com/archives/2011/06/tumer-v-rogers-why-the-supreme-court-is-a-
day-late-and-a-dollar-short.html#more-46984.
24. Bruce Green, A Professional Responsibility Perspective on Turner v. Rogers,




26. Turner v. Rogers, 131 S. Ct. 2507, 2520 (2011).
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The Turner Court's definition of meaningful access echoes the defi-
nition the Court used in Bounds in 1977.27 In Bounds, prisoners claimed
that their right of access to the courts was being violated because they
lacked adequate access to law libraries and as a result had difficulty fil-
ing lawsuits challenging their criminal convictions and the conditions of
their confinement. Justice Marshall, writing for the majority, held that
the Constitution guaranteed the prisoners "a reasonably adequate oppor-
tunity to present claimed violations of fundamental constitutional rights
to the courts."2 8 While the Court's focus was on prisoners' ability to file
petitions and complaints,2 9 the Court also held that prisoners needed ac-
cess to legal materials in order to cite cases in "an adversary presenta-
tion" to respond to arguments made by the state.30
Twenty years later, in Lewis, the Court severely limited Bounds's
interpretation of the requirements of meaningful access. Lewis concerned
a class action brought by people incarcerated in Arizona state prisons,
claiming that they were unable to exercise their right of meaningful ac-
cess to the courts because the law libraries in their prisons contained out-
dated materials, law library staff were insufficiently trained, and access
to photocopying was limited.3 1 Justice Scalia, writing for the majority,
characterized the right of meaningful access as "a right to bring to court a
grievance that the inmate wished to present." 32 He specifically criticized
Bounds for implying "that the State must enable the prisoner to discover
grievances, and to litigate effectively once in court."33
The meaningful access envisioned by Justice Breyer in Turner-the
ability to identify the critical issues in the case and present relevant evi-
dence regarding those issues-is similar to the view of meaningful ac-
cess specifically rejected in Lewis-the ability "to discover grievances,
and to litigate effectively once in court." The Turner Court does not dis-
cuss or even cite Lewis and Bounds. Thus, the Court gives no explanation
for departing from Lewis's narrow definition, and we can only speculate.
The political climate surrounding the cases may be one reason. At
the time Lewis was decided, anti-prisoner sentiment was high. Members
of Congress had touted horror stories regarding frivolous prisoner litiga-
tion, warning that the litigation was overwhelming the courts, unduly
interfering with state control of penal institutions, and impoverishing
27. Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817 (1977).
28. Id. at 825.
29. Id. at 828 n.17.
30. Id at 826.
31. Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 346 (1996).
32. Id. at 354.
33. Id The Lewis Court also imposed a stringent "actual injury" requirement on prisoners
seeking meaningful access, and held that in prisoner cases courts must weigh meaningful access
claims against the prison's legitimate penological interests. Id. at 348-49, 361.
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state governments. 34 The Gingrich Congress had responded in 1996 both
by passing the Prison Litigation Reform Act,35 which made it more diffi-
cult both for prisoners to find attorneys and for them to represent them-
selves, and by placing Legal Services Corporation (LSC)-funded civil
legal aid attorneys off limits to prisoners. Lewis was decided the same
year.
But Lewis was a product of its times in another way, too: it was
based on the premise that providing prisoners with lawyers was the only
way to empower prisoners to "discover grievances, and to litigate effec-
tively once in court." The Court warned: "To demand the conferral of
such sophisticated legal capabilities upon a mostly uneducated and in-
deed largely illiterate prison population is effectively to demand perma-
nent provision of counsel, which we do not believe the Constitution re-
quires." 37 Thus, the Lewis Court's rejection of a broader reading of the
right of meaningful access was based on a tautology: the only way to
satisfy the broader right would be to provide counsel, and the Constitu-
tion does not require the appointment of counsel in civil cases.
In the years that have elapsed since Lewis, there has been a revolu-
tion in assistance for pro se litigants. Forty years after LSC's founding, it
is well established that the supply of civil legal aid attorneys is, and al-
ways has been, grossly inadequate to meet the demand. LSC-funded pro-
grams turn away half the people who seek their help; study after study
shows that, at most, 20% of the legal needs of low-income communities
are satisfied; and in civil cases concerning the lives of low-income peo-
ple, the vast majority of litigants are unrepresented.38
As a result, courts, civil legal aid programs, and community organi-
zations are experimenting with techniques to help unrepresented litigants
in court. These include websites and computer kiosks with online infor-
mation and forms, self-help centers, attorney-for-a-day programs, and
more.39 Justice Breyer's idea that Michael Turner should have been pro-
vided with a "form" is an apparent nod to this spectrum of services.40
34. Amy Petre Hill, Death Through Administrative Indifference: The Prison Litigation Re-
form Act Allows Women to Die in Cahfornia's Substandard Prison Health Care System, 13
HASTINGS WOMEN'S L.J. 223, 236-37 (2002).
35. Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-134, 110 Stat. 1321(1995); see
also David Fathi, The Challenge of Prison Oversight, 47 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1453, 1454-55, 1458-
59(2010).
36. See Omnibus Consolidated Rescissions & Appropriations Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-
134, § 504(a), 110 Stat. 1321, 1321-53 to -56 (1996).
37. Lewis, 518 U.S. at 354.
38. LEGAL SERVICES CORPORATION, DOCUMENTING THE JUSTICE GAP IN AMERICA 1-3, 25-
26 (2009).
39. Deborah Rhode, Whatever Happened to Access to Justice?, 42 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 869,
882-83 (2009).
40. See Benjamin H. Barton & Stephanos Bibas, Triaging Appointed-Counsel Funding and
Pro Se Access to Justice 989 (Univ. Penn L. Sch., Public Law Research Paper No. 11-36, Univ.
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The Turner Court's statement that Mr. Turner should have been
provided with "an opportunity at the hearing. . . to respond to statements
and questions about his financial status (e.g., those triggered by his re-
sponses on the form)"41 echoes another innovation in pro se assistance:
the notion that judges sometimes need to affirmatively question pro se
litigants who have no other way of raising critical issues. 42 Here, the
Court is adopting the Solicitor General's suggestion that "[t]o the extent
the court had questions about the information on the form or disbelieved
it, the court could question the contemnor about his finances at the con-
tempt hearing."4 3 Unlike the Solicitor General, the Court does not specify
that it is the judge who must ask the parent questions about his financial
status raised by his responses on the form. But if the judge does not ask,
who will? It is unlikely that opposing counsel would ask because the
Turner ruling is limited to cases in which there is no attorney on the oth-
er side. An opposing parent is not likely to ask because he is not likely to
be more knowledgeable about the law than the defendant is. And an op-
posing attorney or parent is unlikely to have an incentive to ask Mr.
Turner to clarify unclear responses in a way that would elicit evidence
favorable to Mr. Turner.
Thus, the Turner Court's suggestion resembles the notion, em-
braced by the American Bar Association in a 2008 resolution, that a
judge may have an affirmative duty to question a pro se litigant in order
to elicit relevant information." As Stephen Gillers and Russell Engler
noted in a 2007 report, there has been "a consistent trend to encourage
judges to make reasonable accommodations to unrepresented litigants as
a matter of fairness."4 5 Admittedly, the ABA resolution is a suggestion,
Tenn. Legal Studies Research Paper No. 157, 2011), available at http://ssm.com/abstract-1919534
("Turner invites forward-looking, flexible pro se alternatives."); Chain, supra note 19.
41. Turner v. Rogers, 131 S. Ct. 2507, 2519 (2011).
42. See Zorza, supra note 21, at 16 (characterizing Turner as an "effective endorsement of
judicial engagement as helping ensure, and indeed sometimes required to ensure, fairness and accu-
racy, and to meet the requirements of due process").
43. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Reversal at 25, Turner v. Rogers,
131 S. Ct. 2507 (2011) (No. 10-10).
44. AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, BEST PRACTICES FOR JUDGES IN THE SETTLEMENT AND
TRIAL OF CASES INVOLVING UNREPRESENTED LITIGANTS IN HOUSING COURT, sec. II.D.8 (2008)
("[I]t may be necessary for the Judge to ask open-ended questions regarding specific elements of the
landlord's claims or the unrepresented tenant's defenses or counterclaims to assist the unrepresented
litigant in articulating the elements of her/his claims, defenses or counterclaims."); see also Russell
Engler, Ethics in Transition: Unrepresented Litigants and the Changing Judicial Role, 22 NOTRE
DAME J.L., ETH. & PUBLIC POL'Y 367 (2010); N.Y. CNTY. LAWYERS' ASS'N, BEST PRACTICES FOR
JUDGES IN THE SETTLEMENT AND TRIAL OF CASES INVOLVING UNREPRESENTED LITIGANTS IN
HOUSING COURT 11 (2008), available at http://www.nycla.org/
siteFiles(Publications/Publicationsl 166_1.pdf; Russell Engler, And Justice for All-Including the
Unrepresented Poor: Revisiting the Roles of the Judges, Mediators, and Clerks, 67 FORDHAM L.
REV. 1987, 2017 (1999).
45. Russell Engler & Stephen Gillers, Background Memo on Judicial Ethics: The Role of
Judges in Settlement and Trial in Cases Involving Unrepresented Litigants, in New York County
Lawyers' Association, REPORT ON PROTOCOLS FOR JUDGES IN THE SETTLEMENT AND TRIAL OF
CASES INVOLVING UNREPRESENTED LITIGANTS app. A at 2 n.6 (2006), available at
http://www.nycla.org/siteFiles/News/News59 2.pdf; see also Russell Engler, The Toughest Nut:
2012] 811
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not a requirement, and it is hardly embraced in all courts by all judges.46
But the salient point is that the idea of an affirmative judicial obligation
to question pro se litigants was gaining ground just as the Turner deci-
sion came down.
The spectrum of self-help services is a necessary innovation in light
of the extreme shortage of counsel for low-income communities. At the
same time, we lack an evidence base to determine the scope and efficacy
of self-help services.47 Some worry that self-help services will provide
the appearance of a solution to the pro se crisis when in fact pro se liti-
gants still cannot effectively assert their claims.4 8 To some extent, the
Turner opinion provides evidence for these fears. The Solicitor General's
contention that there were adequate alternatives to counsel was clearly a
basis for the Turner Court's rejection of the right to counsel in Turner's
case. Jo-Ann Wallace, President and CEO of the National Legal Aid and
Defender Association, warns that Turner "could potentially be interpret-
ed to lessen the need for attorneys in cases in which they are essential."4 9
At the same time, the case demonstrates that while government, in-
cluding the judiciary, is often paralyzed by policies that appear too ex-
pensive or unwieldy, it can be persuaded to act when the solution appears
more manageable. The Lewis Court developed a narrow view of "mean-
ingful access" in the belief that truly meaningful access--enabling pro se
litigants to litigate effectively- would require the appointment of coun-
sel and be prohibitively expensive.5 0 Believing that cheaper pro se help
options would suffice to enable pro se litigants to litigate effectively, the
Turner Court was able to embrace a definition of meaningful access that
encompassed the ability to litigate.
Handling Cases Pitting Unrepresented Litigants Against Represented Ones, 62 JUVENILE & FAMILY
CT. J. 10 (2011) (tracing the chronology of guidelines regarding judicial engagement in cases involv-
ing pro se litigants).
46. See Engler & Gillers, supra note 45, at 21 (acknowledging the need for judicial education
and training to "embolden judges who might otherwise feel isolated and fearful to use these tech-
niques").
47. DEBORAH RHODE, ACCESS TO JUSTICE 120-21 (2004); Laura Abel, Evidence-Based
Access to Justice, 13 U. PA. J.L & Soc. CHANGE 295, 297 (2010); Sande Buhai, Access to Justice for
Unrepresented Litigants: A Comparative Perspective, 42 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 979, 993 (2009).
48. See, e.g., Gary Blasi, How Much Access? How Much Justice?, 73 FORDHAM L. REV. 865,
871-73 (2004).
49. Jo-Ann Wallace, Turner v. Rogers Is a Watershed Moment for Civil Justice Guidance,
CONCURRING OPINIONS (June 27, 2011, 3:03 PM),
http://www.concurringopinions.com/archives/2011/06/tumer-v-rogers-is-watershed-moment-for-
civil-justice-guidance.html#more-47345.
50. See RHODE, supra note 47, at 9-10 ("As law professor Geoffrey Hazard has noted, no
'politically sober judge, however anguished by injustice unfolding before her eyes,' could welcome
the battles involved in trying to establish some broadly enforceable right to counsel.").
812 [Vol. 89:4
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III. THE TURNER COURT OVERSTEPPED THE APPELLATE ROLE WHEN IT
FOUND THAT NOTICE, A FORM, A HEARING, AND A FINDING WOULD
PROVIDE MEANINGFUL ACCESS
What Turner gives with one hand, it takes away with the other. As
the previous section discussed, the Court signals a possible willingness to
demand that courts do more to provide meaningful access. However, the
Turner Court relies on supposition regarding the types of assistance that
will enable a pro se litigant to obtain meaningful access, rather than en-
gaging in an evidence-based examination of what it would take for a
litigant to have such access. 5' As a rule, federal appellate courts decide
cases based on the facts in the record. Ideally, the trial court will have
made findings of fact. The appellate court then reviews most factual find-
52
ings deferentially, asking only whether they are clearly erroneous.
When, as in Turner, the factual findings are made by a state court and
concern a claimed violation of a federal constitutional right, however, the
appellate court may scrutinize the factual findings more closely, and will
apply particular scrutiny to whether the trial court attached the proper
significance to the facts.53 Even then, however, appellate courts tend to
accept the trial court's findings. And, appellate courts tend to refrain
from making new findings based on facts that were not before the trial
court.54
The Turner Court departed from this method of review quite dra-
matically. It accepted as true a claim presented by the Solicitor. General
for the first time in an amicus brief: that notice, a form, a hearing at
51. See Judith Resnik, Fairness in Numbers: A Comment on AT&T v. Concepcion, Wal-Mart
v. Dukes, and Turner v. Rogers, 125 HARv. L. REv. 78, 93 (2011) (characterizing Turner as "predi-
cated on Justices' own impressionistic senses of both the costs and the benefits of using particular
procedures"); id. at 158 (criticizing the Mathews v. Eldridge test used in Turner because "[n]either
judges nor litigants can identify with any rigor the actual costs of various procedures, let alone
model (or know) the impact in terms of false positives and negatives produced by the same, more, or
different processes. . . . While one can state the equation, one cannot do the math because the data
are missing. Interpretative choices abound."); Norman Reimer, Turner v. Rogers and the Ghost of
Gagnon v. Scarpelli, THE CHAMPION, July-Aug. 2011, at 7,
http://www.nacdl.org/champion.aspx?id=20800 ("From the criminal defense practitioner's stand-
point, the Court's decision betrays naive simplicity and a breathtaking disconnect from the real
world.").
52. FED. R. Clv. P. 52(a)(6) ("Findings of fact, whether based on oral or other evidence, must
not be set aside unless clearly erroneous, and the reviewing court must give due regard to the trial
court's opportunity to judge the witnesses' credibility."); CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R.
MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 2571 (3d ed. 2012); see, e.g., Cal. Retail Liquor
Dealers Ass'n v. Midcal Aluminum, Inc., 445 U.S. 97, 111-12 (1980) ("[W]e customarily accept the
factual findings of state courts in the absence of 'extraordinary circumstances."') (quoting Lloyd A.
Fry Roofing Co. v. Wood, 344 U.S. 157, 160 (1952)).
53. Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual Group of Boston, 515 U.S. 557,
567-68 (1995) (stating that Supreme Court would "make a fresh examination of crucial facts" pre-
sented to the trial court in First Amendment case).
54. WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 52 § 2577 (3d ed. 2012); see, e.g., Boy Scouts of America
v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640, 648-49 (2000) (conducting "independent review" of the "factual record" in
First Amendment case, without adding facts not already in the record). But see Brianne J. Gorod,
The Adversarial Myth: Appellate Court Extra-Record Factfinding, 61 DUKE L.J. 1, 26-35 (2011)
(describing cases in which Supreme Court relied on facts not in the record).
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which the judge could question the defendant, and a finding "can assure
the 'fundamental fairness' of the proceeding even where the State does
not pay for counsel for an indigent defendant."5" There was no evidence
on this question before the trial court, and the parties themselves did not
brief it at the Supreme Court. 56 If the Court were following usual appel-
late procedure, it would have sent the case back to the trial court for an
assessment of the facts." Or, because Mr. Turner himself could not bene-
fit from such a factual assessment because he had already served his
prison term, the appellate court would have described the legal standard
and left it to trial courts in future cases to determine what measures
would enable litigants to adequately present a defense, given the liti-
gants' educational background, cognitive abilities, and the complexity of
the case.
To be sure, courts are not required to hear evidence regarding facts
that are self-evident or are a matter of common sense. 59 The Supreme
Court has a long tradition of relying on common sense or intuition, rather
than empirical evidence, to determine whether a particular type of help is
needed to provide meaningful access to court.60 That is entirely appropri-
ate when a litigant claims that a particular type of help is needed to over-
come an absolute roadblock to meaningful participation. For instance,
common sense is all that is required to determine whether a person con-
fined to a wheelchair needs help getting to a second-floor courtroom.6 1
Common sense suffices to determine whether imposition of a fee at a
particular stage in a case will preclude an indigent litigant from partici-
pating in that stage.6 2 The same is true of the cases in which indigent
litigants argue that the state should pay for tests, experts, and other types
55. Turner v. Rogers, 131 S. Ct. 2507, 2519-20 (2011); see also id. at 2524 (Thomas, J.,
dissenting) ("'The record is insufficient' regarding alternative procedures because '[t]hey were
raised for the very first time at the merits stage here; so, there's been no development' (quoting Tr.
of Oral Arg. 49, 43)).
56. Barton & Bibas, supra note 40, at 989 n. 108("[T]he Court, reaching the issue sua sponte,
did not have the benefit of research or briefing on the various procedures with which states are
experimenting to facilitate pro se access to civil justice.").
57. See, e.g., Sprint/United Mgmt. Co. v. Mendelsohn, 552 U.S. 379, 380-81 (2008) (chiding
court of appeals for balancing probative value of evidence against possible prejudicial effect, and
remanding case for trial court to make that determination in the first instance); Pullman-Standard v.
Swint, 456 U.S. 273, 291-93 (1982) (holding that court of appeals should not have considered evi-
dence that trial court failed to consider, and remanding to trial court for consideration of that evi-
dence in the first instance).
58. See, e.g., Lassiter v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 452 U.S. 18, 31-32 (1981).
59. See Fed. R. Evid. 702 (permitting expert testimony only when "specialized knowledge
will help the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue").
60. See, e.g., Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 344 (1963) ("Not only these precedents
but also reason and reflection require us to recognize that in our adversary system of criminal justice,
any person haled into court, who is too poor to hire a lawyer, cannot be assured a fair trial unless
counsel is provided for him. This seems to us to be an obvious truth.").
61. See Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509, 529 (2004).
62. See M.L.B. v. S.L.J., 519 U.S. 102, 106-07 (1996) (record preparation fee in appeal of
termination of parental rights); Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 374 (1971) (right to waiver of
court costs on basis of indigence in divorce case); Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 17-19 (1956)
(right to free transcript for first appeal from criminal conviction).
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of necessary evidence.63 Likewise, common sense may suffice when a
litigant seeks an opportunity to present documentary evidence or live
testimony.
But intuition is inadequate to the task of determining whether coun-
sel is necessary for a litigant to have meaningful access, and whether less
expensive types of assistance along the spectrum of pro se help will suf-
fice to allow a pro se litigant to participate meaningfully in his case. The
Turner Court wrote that for many defendants facing civil contempt for
failure to pay child support, a form would enable them to demonstrate
their inability to pay. But will just any "form" enable the average liti-
gant to provide the court with necessary information? Depending on font,
sentence and word length, and line spacing, as well as on the education
levels and cognitive capacities of the particular litigants, the form may be
66incomprehensible to a large percentage of litigants.
Intuition is not only an insufficient tool for determining whether a
pro se litigant has meaningful access; it is a biased one. That is to say, it
will not only render the wrong result, but more often than not it will re-
sult in pro se litigants being denied the assistance they need for meaning-
ful access. Judges are more likely to believe that the substance and pro-
cedures of the cases they hear are comprehensible to the average person
than they are to believe that the cases are complicated and incomprehen-
sible. Judges, after all, have received three years of legal training aimed
at instilling familiarity with law and procedure.68 They have experience
63. See Little v. Streater, 452 U.S. 1, 16-17 (1981) (state must pay for blood grouping tests
sought by an indigent litigant).
64. See Richardson v. Wright, 405 U.S. 208, 209 (1972) (declining to reach merits after
Social Security Administration began providing benefits recipients with notice and an opportunity to
submit rebuttal evidence).
65. Turner v. Rogers, 131 S. Ct. 2507, 2519 (2011).
66. See Nat'l Cancer Inst., Simplification of Informed Consent Documents, CANCER.GOV
(Aug, 8, 2011), http://www.cancer.gov/clinicaltrials/patientsafety/simplification-of-informed-
consent-docs/page2 ("Use of active voice, short sentences, personal pronouns, clear page layout with
'white space' borders, and large fonts make documents easier to read.").
67. SELF-REPRESENTATION LITIG. NETWORK, TOUR GUIDE: A SELF-GUIDED TOUR OF YOUR
COURTHOUSE FROM THE PERSPECTIVE OF A SELF-REPRESENTED LITIGANT 5 (2008), available at
http://www.courts.ca.gov/partners/documents/tourguide.pdf ("[A] judge or administrator may not
even observe barriers that may exist for uninitiated members of the public in an environment that is
so familiar to him or her . . . ."); JOHN M. GRAECEN, RESOURCES TO ASSIST SELF-REPRESENTED
LITIGANTS: A FIFTY-STATE REVIEW OF THE "STATE OF THE ART" 23 (National ed. 2011) ("[S]tate
level forms committees made up of judges and attorneys are incapable of achieving the objective of
third grade forms comprehension without the assistance of language experts. . . .The inherent bias of
legally trained professionals is towards the use of familiar and precise legal terminology because
specific legal terms are used in statutes and case law and have acquired an accretion of accepted
meaning and nuance that seems difficult or impossible to convey in a few words of plain English.
The legally trained mind seems invariably to favor precision in legal meaning over general under-
standability when choosing the words to use in a form."), available at
http://www.msbf.org/selfhelp/GreacenReportNationalEdition.pdf. Of course, there are many judges
who have a deep understanding of the problems faced by pro se litigants. My point here is simply
that judges have a tendency to underestimate the difficulty of self representation.
68. WILLIAM M. SULLIVAN ET AL., SUMMARY, EDUCATING LAWYERS: PREPARATION FOR
THE PROFESSION OF LAW 5 (2007), available at
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in the workings of their own courtrooms and the case law, laws, and
rules used therein. And they do not have a large stake in the cases before
them, unlike the litigants, who may have difficulty thinking clearly in a
case involving the potential loss of a child, home, or livelihood.69
There are two types of empirical data that courts could consider to
more rigorously assess whether a particular type of assistance is suffi-
cient to provide a litigant with meaningful access. First, courts could
assess the tasks litigants need to perform in that type of case, the obsta-
cles to performing those tasks, and the interventions that would suffice to
enable litigants to overcome those obstacles. This Article will use the
term "process analysis" to describe that method. Second, courts could
consider "outcome" studies, which compare the outcomes of those cases
in which the intervention was provided with those in which the interven-
tion was not provided.7 0
As the Article describes below, Turner's reliance on intuition in lieu
of empirical data to determine whether a litigant has meaningful access is
of a piece with the Court's analytical style in two other seminal cases in
which unrepresented people sought attorney assistance: Lassiter v. De-
partment of Social Services and Walters v. National Association of Radi-
ation Survivors.7' As this section shows, taken together, the cases evince
a willingness to reach conclusions that certain litigants have meaningful
access even in the absence of reliable evidence.
A. Process Analysis
Courts could rely on process analysis to assess claims that a certain
type of assistance is necessary to allow a litigant to obtain meaningful
access. Using this method, a researcher would compile a list of all the
tasks that a litigant must perform in that type of case, and then assess the
obstacles that litigants face in performing those tasks and whether the
assistance requested will allow a litigant to perform the tasks.7 2 Michael
Turner presented this type of evidence when he argued that the willful-
ness or ability to pay determination can be complex.7 3 For example, a
http://www.camegiefoundation.org/sites/default/files/publications/elibrarypdf 632.pdf ("Within
months of their arrival in law school, students demonstrate new capacities for understanding legal
processes, for seeing both sides of legal arguments, for sifting through facts and precedents in search
of the more plausible account, for using precise language, and for understanding the applications and
conflicts of legal rules.").
69. See Lisa Brodoff, Lifting Burdens: Proof Social Justice, and Public Assistance Adminis-
trative Hearings, 30 J. NAT'L Ass'N ADMIN. L. JUDICIARY 601, 625 (2010) ("When a pro se liti-
gant's income, assets, healthcare and well-being are on the line, he or she faces formidable emotion-
al barriers to articulating a clear case and proving facts. In the best circumstances it is diflicult to
keep a clear head and an objective view of the strengths and weaknesses of the case.").
70. See Abel, supra note 47, at 299-300 (using this typology).
71. Lassiter v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 452 U.S. 18, 24-25 (1981); Walters v. Nat'l Ass'n of
Radiation Survivors, 473 U.S. 305, 326 (1985).
72. Abel, supra note 47, at 304.
73. Brief for Petitioner at 35-36, 46, Turner v. Rogers, 131 S. Ct. 2507 (2011) (No. 10-10).
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defendant may have to show not only that he is unemployed, but that he
has not made any unwise choices about how to spend his money. 4 The
Turner Court also had before it evidence that many parents facing civil
contempt have little education,7 5 and that defendants often fail to assert
76meritorious defenses in these cases.
However, as described above, there was no evidence before the
Court regarding whether the Court's solution-notice, a form, a hearing
at which the judge could question the defendant, and a finding-would
enable either Mr. Turner or the typical litigant to adequately present a
defense, given the litigant's educational background, cognitive abilities,
and the complexity of the case. Thus, to complete the process analysis by
determining that the solution would in fact provide meaningful access,
the Supreme Court relied solely on unsupported contentions offered in an
amicus brief.
In Walters, the Supreme Court rejected the district court's explicit
factual findings regarding the difficulty of self-representation. In that
case, veterans who were injured in U.S. atomic bomb tests challenged a
statute barring attorneys from accepting more than $10 to represent vet-
erans seeking disability benefits from the Veterans Administration. Con-
sidering this claim, the district court reviewed what it characterized as "a
full factual presentation as to the actual operation and effect of the
$10.00 limit." 77
Holding that the plaintiffs were highly likely to succeed on their
claim that the $10 cap violated the veterans' due process rights, the dis-
trict court judge found that "[t]he undisputed factual evidence submitted
by the plaintiffs in this case shows that both the procedures and the sub-
stance entailed in presenting [disability] claims to the VA are extremely
complex." 78 He also found that "neither the VA officials themselves nor
the [non-attorney] service organizations are providing the full array of
services that paid attorneys might make available to claimants."7 9 He
concluded that "[i]t is highly unlikely that veterans or their families will,
74. Id at 35 n.20.
75. Id. at 47; Brief for the National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers et al. as Amici
Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 9 Turner v. Rogers, 131 S. Ct. 2507 (2011) (No. 10-10) ("A 2002
study of fathers with child support obligations found that 41% of indigent fathers did not have a high
school diploma-double the rate for those whose income was not below the poverty threshold.").
76. Brief for the National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers et al., supra note 75, at
14 (2002 HHS study showed that low-income parents are typically ordered to pay a greater propor-
tion of their income than is statutorily allowed).
77. Nat'l Ass'n of Radiation Survivors v. Walters, 589 F. Supp. 1302, 1312 (N.D. Cal. 1984),
rev'd, 473 U.S. 305 (1985).
78. Id. at 1307-08, 1319-20 (citing numerous depositions and affidavits).
79. Id. at 1310, 1320-23 (characterizing this conclusion as being based on "a great deal of
evidence regarding ... the extent to which VA employees or service organization representatives are
able to aid veterans in gathering supporting materials and presenting their claims").
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without the use of an attorney, prove able to build and present their cases
as ably as an attorney."80
The Supreme Court reversed, concluding that in most cases an at-
torney was unnecessary, faulting the district court's process analysis as
incorrect. The Supreme Court held that while some cases might be com-
plex, the district court had not attempted to calculate how often that was
the case.8 Defining "complex" as involving tricky legal questions, the
Court stated that such cases were only "a tiny fraction of the total cases
pending."8 2 Most cases, the Court stated, concerned "simple questions of
fact, or medical questions relating to the degree of a claimant's disabil-
ity."83 The Court thus disagreed with the district court's reading of the
evidence, substituting its own judgment about the difficulty of the tasks
involved in litigating veterans' disability cases for the district court's
factual findings. 84
Taken together, Turner and Walters evince a view of judicial intui-
tion as being sufficient to assess both a pro se litigant's ability to conduct
litigation tasks and the utility of various types of legal assistance. The
Turner Court viewed the issue as so straightforward that it held that the
Constitution required trial courts to provide forms and other sorts of as-
sistance to pro se litigants, even though there was no evidence in the rec-
ord regarding the utility of that assistance. The Walters Court baldly stat-
ed that the district court judge who had reviewed a voluminous record
was simply wrong in his assessment of the difficulty of veterans' benefits
litigation.
B. Outcome Analysis
Another method to determine the value of a potential type of legal
assistance is outcome analysis, which compares the outcomes in cases in
which the intervention is used with those cases in which the intervention
is not used. Apparently, there were no outcome studies before the Court
in Turner. While such evidence was considered in Lassiter and Walters,
the evidence in both cases had serious flaws, and in the end the Court did
not rest its opinions in either case on the outcome evidence before it.
The gold standard in outcome comparison studies involves random-
ly assigning some subjects to a control group (which does not receive the
intervention) and others to a treatment group (which does receive the
80. Id. at 1323.
81. Walters, 473 U.S. at 329.
82. Id. at 329-30.
83. Id.
84. And, as Justice Brennan's dissent noted, instead of merely holding that the district court
had abused its discretion and returning the case to that court for a full trial on the merits, the Su-
preme Court decided the case on the merits, "bootstrapping its way past the rule that we may 'inti-




intervention). Randomization allows researchers to attempt to ensure
that the effects they are observing result from the intervention itself ra-
ther than from some other factor.86 For instance, without random assign-
ment, researchers comparing the outcomes of cases in which litigants had
legal representation with cases in which litigants did not have such repre-
sentation cannot know whether the litigants with lawyers had stronger
cases to begin with. Perhaps the litigants with stronger cases tried harder
to find lawyers, or perhaps the lawyers accepted only the strong cases.
Either instance would be an example of what statisticians call selection
bias.
A possible selection bias problem plagued studies proffered by the
parties in Lassiter." There, the Court held that Abby Gail Lassiter's due
process rights were not violated when South Carolina terminated her
right to a relationship with her infant son William, in a proceeding in
which she was not represented by counsel.89 In a footnote, the Court
acknowledged that both the state defendant and a law journal had con-
ducted "surveys purporting to reveal whether the presence of counsel
reduces the number of erroneous determinations in parental termination
proceedings." The Court dismissed both studies as "unilluminating."90
As Justice Brennan noted in his dissent, both studies found that par-
ents who were represented by counsel had a significantly higher success
rate than parents who were not represented by counsel. 91 These results
could have been the consequence of selection bias because they were not
based on random samples.92 Justice Brennan found them persuasive,
however. He rejected the possibility of selection bias, writing that be-
cause "no evidence in either study indicates that the defendant parent
who can retain or is offered counsel is less culpable than the one who
appears unrepresented, it seems reasonable to infer that a sizable number
of cases against unrepresented parents end in termination solely because
of the absence of counsel."93 The majority did not respond to this line of
reasoning. It made no attempt to grapple in any real way with the studies,
or to determine whether the cases in which counsel makes a difference
are the vast majority or are outliers.
85. D. James Greiner & Cassandra Wolos Pattanayak, Randomized Evaluation in LegalAssis-
tance: What Difference Does Representation (Offer and Actual Use) Make?, 121 YALE L.J. (forth-
coming 2012); Abel, supra note 47, at 299-300.
86. Greiner & Pattanayak, supra note 85.
87. Id.
88. See Michael Millemann, The State Due Process Justification for a Right to Counsel in
Some Civil Cases, 15 TEMP. POL. & Civ. RTS. L. REv. 733, 742-43 (2006) (noting that in Lassiter V.
Department ofSocial Services, 452 U.S. 18 (1981), the Supreme Court underestimated the "risks of
error ... in most contested and litigated cases when litigants are unrepresented").
89. Lassiter v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 452 U.S. 18, 31-32 (1981).
90. Id. at 29 n.5.
91. Id. at 46 n.15.
92. See discussion supra note 85 and accompanying text.
93. Lassiter, 452 U.S. at 46 n.15.
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In contrast to the Lassiter majority's cursory dismissal of the out-
come studies presented in that case, the Walters majority harshly criti-
cized the trial court's refusal to rely on outcome studies. The district
court judge noted that the plaintiffs had gathered "a great deal of evi-
dence" through "extensive discovery." 94 Both sides had presented out-
come comparison studies-"statistics comparing the relative success of
those few attorneys who represent . .. claimants before the VA notwith-
standing the $10.00 fee limit with that of other representatives."9 5 The
veterans claimed that the statistics demonstrated that veterans with attor-
neys were more successful while the government claimed they showed
that veterans with attorneys were no more successful than those with-
out.9 6 The judge declined to decide who was right. Instead, he dismissed
the statistical evidence as irrelevant, writing:
The success rate of those few attorneys who are now taking [disabil-
ity] cases on essentially a pro bono basis is a completely inadequate
predictor of the success rate of paid attorneys. Not only may paid at-
torneys be able to devote more time and resources to the cases, but
they may also develop substantial expertise in the complicated legal
areas involved with SCDD claims. 97
The Supreme Court chided the district court for rejecting the out-
come data proffered by the parties, stating:
We have the most serious doubt whether a competent lawyer taking a
veteran's case on a pro bono basis would give less than his best ef-
fort, and we see no reason why experience in developing facts as to
causation in the numerous other areas of the law where it is relevant
would not be readily transferable to proceedings before the VA. 98
The Supreme Court's critique was apparently based entirely on the
Court's intuition; the Court did not point to any evidence to support its
claim. According to the Court's reading of the statistics, "[r]eliable evi-
dence before the District Court showed that claimants represented by
lawyers have a slightly better success rate before the [Board of Veteran
Appeals] than do claimants represented by service representatives, and
that both have a slightly better success rate than claimants who were not
represented at all."99 In the end it did not matter, however. The Court
concluded that under the Mathews v. Eldridge test for due process viola-
tions, the government's interest in keeping the proceedings non-
94. Nat'l Ass'n of Radiation Survivors v. Walters, 589 F. Supp. 1302, 1310 (D. Cal. 1984).
95. Id. at 1317. Apparently, neither study relied on random assignment or used any other
technique to deal with selection bias.
96. Id.
97. Id. (relying on deposition testimony by director of Compensation and Pension Service for
the Department of Veterans Benefits).
98. Walters v. Nat'1 Ass'n of Radiation Survivors, 473 U.S. 305, 328 (1985).
99. Id at 331.
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adversarial outweighed any advantage the veterans might obtain from
having a lawyer. 00
There are some striking similarities between the treatment of out-
come studies in Lassiter and Walters. First, in both cases, at least one of
the parties offered an outcome study as evidence of the extent to which
attorneys do or do not make a difference in particular types of cases.
However, there were serious flaws in the studies. None of the studies
used randomization, so it was impossible to know whether the outcomes
observed were the result of attorney representation or of some other fac-
tor. In Walters, the outcome studies had another potential problem: while
the plaintiffs were seeking the ability to pay attorneys at a market rate,
there were no attorneys yet handling those cases at a market rate. As a
result, the studies could not assess the efficacy of market rate representa-
tion.
Second, at least some of the judges in both cases attempted to de-
termine whether the studies were probative of the difference an attorney
would make. However, the judges do not appear to have had testimony
from any statistical experts to help them make this determination. As a
result, they were forced to use their own intuitions about the difference
that legal representation would make in the case.
Third, in the end, the Court did not base its holdings on the statisti-
cal evidence. The Lassiter Court held that no matter how much differ-
ence a lawyer might make, Ms. Lassiter could not show that she was
prejudiced by the lack of counsel; the Walters Court held that the value
of keeping the proceedings non-adversarial outweighed any increase in
accuracy that a lawyer might impart.
IV. CONCLUSION
We do not yet know how courts will apply Turner; too little time
has elapsed since it was issued. The choices are clear, however: Turner
may come to stand for a definition of meaningful access to the courts as
including the ability to identify and present arguments and evidence re-
garding the central issues in a case. Or, it may come to stand for the
proposition that the meaningful access standard is toothless, given the
instinctive belief of many judges that self-representation is easier than it
really is.
The outcome may depend on whether future cases involve empirical
evidence. Unfortunately, there is a shortage of reliable data concerning
what kind of legal assistance various types of litigants need to obtain
meaningful access.'0o A few social scientists are attempting to fill the
100. Id.
101. Greiner & Pattanayak, supra note 85; Jeffrey Selbin et al., Access to Evidence: How an
Evidence-Based Delivery System Can Improve Legal Aidfor Low- and Moderate-Income Americans,
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void. A randomized study by University of California at Irvine law pro-
fessor Carroll Seron found that lawyer representation made a large dif-
ference in whether tenants facing eviction in New York City kept their
homes.10 2 Harvard law professor James Greiner and statistician Cassan-
dra Wolos Pattanyak are working their way through an ambitious agenda
of randomized outcome studies examining the effects of offers of attor-
ney representation and other types of legal assistance.1 03 They report that
offers of representation in unemployment insurance cases by a Harvard
Law School clinic did not affect the likelihood that the claimants would
prevail, although they were unable to reach a conclusion about whether
the actual use of representation affected the outcome. 104 Preliminary re-
sults from another of their studies, involving full-fledged lawyers han-
dling eviction cases in a Massachusetts district court (a court of general
jurisdiction), found that the clients were far more likely to retain posses-
sion of their homes when they received full representation than when
they received only limited legal assistance involving advice and help
filling out forms.10 5 In a third study, however, full-fledged lawyers han-
dling eviction cases in a specialized housing court in Massachusetts had
no greater effect on their clients' ability to retain possession whether they
provided full legal representation or just limited assistance. o0 American
Bar Foundation researcher Rebecca Sandefur has conducted a meta-
analysis of the existing studies regarding the effects of attorney represen-
tation, leading her to conclude that attorneys have a larger effect on the
outcome of their clients' cases in procedurally complex cases than in
cases in which the procedures are relatively straightforward. 10 7 These and
similar studies hold out a promise that some day we may have enough
outcome studies for courts to conclude confidently that a particular type
of assistance is or is not necessary for a litigant to obtain meaningful
access in a civil case.
We are not yet there, though. There simply are too few reliable out-
come studies to be able to reach conclusions extending much beyond the
specific findings of each study. The outcomes of these particular studies
AMERICAN PROGRESS 6 (June 2011), http://www.americanprogress.org/issues/2011/06/
pdf/evidence.pdf; Abel, supra note 47, at 301-02.
102. Carroll Seron et al., The Impact of Legal Counsel on Outcomes for Poor Tenants in New
York City's Housing Court: Results of a Randomized Experiment, 35 LAW & SOC'Y REV. 419, 419
(2001).
103. Greiner & Pattanayak, supra note 85.
104. Id.
105. D. James Greiner et al., The Limits of Unbundled Legal Assistance: A Randomized Study
in a Massachusetts District Court and Prospects for the Future (Mar. 29, 2012) (forthcoming Harvard
Law Review), available at http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/
cfdev/AbsByAuth.cfm?perid=1300384#showl948286.
106. D. James Greiner et al., How Effective Are Limited Legal Assistance Programs? A Ran-
domized Experiment in Massachusetts Housing Court (Mar. 12, 2012) (unpublished paper) available
at http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/cf dev/AbsByAuth.cfm?per id=1 300384#showl 880078.
107. Rebecca L. Sandefur, The Impact of Counsel: An Analysis of Empirical Evidence, 9
SEATTLE J. FOR Soc. JUST. 51, 51-52 (2010).
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may well depend on the characteristics of the particular lawyers who
handled the cases, the substantive law in that particular jurisdiction, or
procedures in the courts in which the cases were handled.108 In contrast
to the small number of rigorous outcome studies that have examined the
effect of attorney representation, a recent New Jersey Supreme Court
opinion regarding the reliability of eyewitness identifications rested on
the conclusions of a special master who had reviewed "testimony by
seven experts and . . . more than 2,000 pages of transcripts along with
hundreds of scientific studies." 09
For now, courts may have to rely more on careful process analysis
to assess litigants' abilities. The expertise psychiatrists have amassed
regarding the capabilities of criminal defendants may be helpful here." 0
The expertise of the many court officials, legal aid attorneys, and others
who staff self-help centers may prove useful, too."' Only when meaning-
ful access cases start focusing on these types of hard data can we expect
that the courts will begin providing truly meaningful access.
108. Greiner & Pattanayak, supra note 85 (cautioning "that studies of the kind we conduct here
are heavily dependent on context," and writing that "with numerous studies, we could begin to make
more informed guesses as to which aspects of context matter most, and to base policy and funding
decisions on these more informed guesses").
109. State v. Henderson, 208 N.J. 208, 217-18 (2011).
110. See generally Brief for Am. Psychiatric Assoc & Am. Acad. of Psychiatry and the Law as
Amicus Curiae in Support of Neither Party, Indiana v. Edwards 554 U.S. 164 (2008) (No. 07-208),
2008 WL 405546.
Ill. See John D. Graecen, Resources to Assist Self-Represented Litigants: A Fifty-State Review
of "State of the Art" MICHIGAN STATE BAR FOUND. (2011),
http://www.msbf.org/selfhelp/GreacenReportNationalEdition.pdf (describing self-help programs and
insights that the people who staff them have gained).
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